Media manipulation and political control in Russia

The political system Putin has built rests on two pillars: the ‘resource blessing’ and traditional societal weakness. In late 2008, the former was seriously shaken: as the global economic crisis reduced the price of oil to less than one-third of its previous level, Putin’s carefully constructed system was suddenly tested by circumstances beyond his control. The robust growth and budget surplus of the past few years are over, and there is little doubt among economists that 2009 will be a year of recession and budget deficit.

Production is down, the rouble is losing value, unemployment is up, and there is a rapidly rising sense of insecurity among the people. Meanwhile, economic crisis policies are made by a closed circle of top officials in the habitual, ontransparent way, raising suspicions of inefficient and corrupt distribution of government funds.

The mass-audience channels are playing down the gravity of the crisis; their
coverage is, as usual, focused on Russia’s leaders, who are shown firmly in
charge and taking good care of the people. So as not to arouse unwelcome
public reaction, the mass protests that took place in the Russian Far East in
December 2008 simply went unreported. But the government may be facing a
serious dilemma: if the gap between life on the screen and hard everyday
realities gets too broad, television may no longer prove an efficient tool in
maintaining social and political stability. On the other hand, easing the
government’s grip on coverage runs counter to the very nature of the current
regime. The more independent media outlets are comprehensively reporting
economic and social developments, and the picture they paint is increasingly
disquieting. Hence another dilemma: the logic of Putin‘s rule may push for still
tighter controls of the defiant media, but at a time of economic troubles such a
move may backfire by fostering discontent.

If the crisis hits Putin’s rock-solid approval rating (according to the Levada
Center’s survey conducted in January 2009, it was still over 80 per cent,
despite the growing concerns related to the crisis)13 it may also shake the
hitherto solid loyalty of the elites. Loyalty to the government paid off when the
economy was booming, but recession may impel the elites to take the
initiative and push for political change. According to The New Times, ‘small
and medium-sized businesses may finally understand that liberalization of the
regime is their only chance to survive’.14 Business and other elites remain
timid, but if they realize the urgency of the current economic crisis, they may
press for such liberalization. This might then undermine the other pillar of the
regime: paternalistic governance and the overwhelming dominance of the
state over the society.

For the first time since Putin became president and moved to reconsolidate
the state, there is a chance of a reverse swing: a rise of societal activity and
political pluralism. This would enable the media to regain political relevance
and reassume the role of serving the public interest. But a darker scenario is
far from ruled out: in seeking to pre-empt or suppress public protests and
political turmoil, the government may opt for a further crackdown and
isolationist, anti-Western policies.


Source: Maria Lipman (editor of Pro et Contra and Co-Chair of the Carnegie
Moscow Center Program Civil Society and the Regions)